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Silvio Ferrari and W. Cole Durham (eds.) Law and Religion in Post-Communist Europe
(Leuven: Peeters 2003). 427pp.. Reviewed by Johan D. van der Vyver.
The radical political transition of Eastern European countries from communism to a
more or less democratic dispensation has had an influence on almost every aspect of social
structures within the newly emancipated states, and on the personal lives of peoples
belonging to those communities.  Modalities of human existence associated with religious
institutions, confessional commitments, and a religiously-based moral life style, are no
exceptions in this regard. Describing the relationships between law and religion within
altogether sixteen Eastern European states, written in each instance by a distinguished expert
on religious freedom from the state concerned, is the focus of the volume under review.
Putting together an anthology on the laws and practices relating to the symbiosis of
law and  religion in different countries written by a distinct expert from each country being
surveyed has its advantages.  It is hardly possible for a single author to have the in-depth
knowledge of the laws and practices of all the countries being included in the survey.  Here,
the reader is given the benefit of analyses by persons who not only derive their knowledge
from academic study and discourse, but who are also on the spot, and who through their
empirical exposure to the system and its manifestations are best equipped to provide a
reliable contemporaneo exposito.
But following this method may also have its shortcomings.  Each person has a certain
slant to his or her interests and understanding and could therefore contribute to an admittedly
colorful quilt, but one that lacks a coherent pattern or central consistency. Too many cooks
could also make a truly comparative perception of the central theme quite impossible.
The editors of Law and Religion in Post-Communist Europe avoided a patchwork
conglomeration by selecting their authors from among the best; and perhaps more
importantly, by instructing the authors to deal with the same set of pertinent questions:
describe the social dimensions and historical setting of law and religion in your country, the
legal sources relevant to the subject-matter of the anthology, the legal status of religious
institutions/communities, labor law affecting the churches, the financing of religious
institutions, assistance afforded to religion in public institutions, the legal status of priests and
members of religious orders, the impact of religion in matrimonial affairs and in family law,
religion in education, and the rules of criminal law relating to religion.  These are recurring
themes in almost all the chapters of the book.  Some authors did not afford a distinct place to
all of these themes in a main paragraph, combining several of them under a more general
heading, or not dealing with one or more of them at all.  The legal status of the clergy and
religious orders (erroneously referred to in the piece on Albania as the “religious” status of
priests and members of religious orders), for example, is neglected in the chapters on Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, and Poland, criminal sanctions pertinent to freedom of religion
or belief is not specifically dealt with in the case of Estonia, Latvia, and Poland. This could
perhaps be explained on the basis that these subject-matters are not particularly significant in
the countries concerned, or have not attracted special regulation in those countries.
Religion and the media might also have been among the topics authors were asked to
deal with, but the media only received special mention in the chapters on Albania, Bulgaria,
Croatia, the Czech Republic, and Latvia.  Some authors have added somewhat isolated
subject-matters to the ones dealt with by most, for example a paragraph on churches and
culture (Albania, the Czech Republic and Macedonia), the problem of conscientious
objections (Bulgaria), church-state relations (Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia,
and Ukraine), and (most usefully) a section on “key issues”, “main features”, or “basic
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characteristics” of the system (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia).
It is in a sense unfortunate that some authors did not follow the sequence and exact
sub-titles of the subject-matters which they were instructed to cover.  This makes
comparative research from the volume somewhat more complicated.  It even in some
instances entail inaccuracies.  For example, Evis Karandrea, writing on Church and State in
Albania, has included in the survey a paragraph on “The Right to Self-Determination of
Churches and Religious Communities in Internal Affairs”. The right to self-determination as
defined in international human rights law does belong to religious communities (people
united by a common confession) but not to religious institutions (a church as a structural
social entity).  The right to self-determination demands of the state to permit religious
communities to profess and to practice their faith.  The competence of a church institution to
conduct its own internal affairs and organize its domestic governmental design without state
interference is a matter of church autonomy and not of self-determination.
There are two country-specific chapters that do not follow the methodological design
that is more or less current in all the others.  The one analyzes “Church and State in the East
German Länder of the Former German Democratic Republic.”  The problems facing regions
of the former German Democratic Republic are indeed quite different from those experienced
by the other Eastern European states—if for no other reason, then simply because upon
unification of East and West Germany in 1990, the German Basic Law was made applicable
to the entire country.  It was therefore more a question of the East German Länder having to
come to terms with existing constitutional decrees and legal arrangements of church-state and
freedom of religion matters.  An overview by Axel Frhr von Campenhausen of the trials and
tribulations that attended the unification process represents a most insightful addendum to the
chapters on Eastern European countries properly so-called.
The other country-specific chapter that seems to be at odds, is one by Vsevolod
Chaplin dealing essentially with the Russian Law of 1997 On the Freedom of Conscience and
on Religious Associations from the perspective of the Russian Orthodox Church (a preceding
chapter by Lev Simkin deals with “Church and State in Russia” in accordance with the
general methodological design of the volume).  The chapter by Chaplin may be defined as an
apology for the 1997 Law. It is informative, but also designed to show that the Law “has not
resulted in mass discrimination against religious minorities, as some critics of the Law
predicted to try to frighten us” (at 283).  Chaplin reduces the disputes that erupted in religious
circles when the 1997 Law replaced the Law of 1990 On the Freedom of Faiths to a
prevailing dichotomy between the “Westernizers” and “Slavophiles”.  The “Westernizers”
can perhaps more accurately be defined as those who attempted to impose upon, or import
into, Eastern European countries the typical American perception of religious freedom (the
separation of church and state is not a typical Western or European institution), while the
“Slavonites”, according to Chaplin, are those who “in religious and social thinking ...
perceive the church body, society, and the state as a single whole” (at 286).  The problems
experienced in Russia with the Law of 1990 derived precisely from the fact that its drafters
sought to impose the American model on a community with a totally different political and
cultural mind-set.  In reaction—in this reviewer’s opinion—the 1997 Law went somewhat
overboard by unduly restricting the religious rights of denominations that lacked the 15 years
tenure in Russia, which has been stipulated in the Law as the divide between the (privileged)
“religious organizations” and the (disadvantaged) “religious groups”—and in response to
Chaplin, it might be noted that the disadvantages of the latter group stipulated in Article 27.3
of the 1997 Law go well beyond concerns of affording tax exemptions to those institutions
RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXV, 2 (MAY 2005) page 69.
that have not yet “proved their viability by fifteen years of existence” (at 283).  It must be
conceded, though, that the Russian authorities have applied the law with circumspection and
without “mass discrimination against religious minorities” (at 283).
I have singled out the chapter by Vsevolod Chaplin for special scrutiny in order to
make a point that could perhaps best be highlighted through a personal anecdote.  A few
years ago, I was invited to participate in a dialogue with a group of Chinese Christians who
were seeking assistance and advice on the drafting of a law on religious freedom for China.
Shortly before that time, China had signed (not ratified) the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, and our Chinese friends thought this was an opportune moment to come
forward with a law on religious freedom. My advice, in a nut shell, was not to carbon copy
the American model of religious freedom; that would be too much freedom too soon.  If you
are looking for a precedent to follow, go to Eastern European countries in transition that have
avoided a leap from the one extreme to the other.  I specially commended the Polish Law of
17 May 1989 On Guarantees of Freedom of Conscience and Belief—and just for the record,
the (American) sponsors of our discussions presumably did not care for my advice, because I
was not invited to participate in subsequent meetings with the Chinese group.
The point is—and this is borne out by the Russian experience—that the transition
from a totalitarian regime, to be practical, must for at least an interim period retain some state
control of religious activities and institutions.  Attempts in Bulgaria to replace the Religious
Denominations Act of 1949 with one that would guarantee freedom of religion in accordance
with the Constitution of 1991 (which according to Jenia Peteva upholds the fundamentals of
religious pluralism, separation between religion and state, autonomy of religious
denominations and non-discrimination (at 39)), has been unsuccessful thus far, due probably
to the ongoing rivalries between the Bulgarian brand of “Westernizers” and “Slavonites”.
The Polish Law held out here as a model for countries in transition from totalitarian
state control of, and interference in, matters of religion is from a radical religious freedom
perspective quite censurable.  It contains a long list of competencies afforded by the state to
citizens as components of the freedom of conscience and belief (art. 2): the right to create
churches and other religious unions and to belong or not to belong to them; to participate in
religious functions and services, fulfill religious duties, and observe religious holidays; to
profess one’s religion or convictions; to bring up one’s children according to one’s religious
convictions; not to profess one’s religion or belief; to maintain contact with other persons of
one’s faith and to participate in international religious organizations; to utilize information
sources in matters of religion; to produce, to purchase, and to make use of objects required
for religious cult purposes and religious practices; to produce, purchase and possess articles
required for observing religious rites; to choose a clerical or monastic order; to establish lay
organizations with a view to realizing objectives of a professed religion or conviction.
Poland established, as part of the state administration, the Office of Denominational Affairs
as a link, on the political front, between church and state (art. 15(1)). The creation of a church
or other religious union in Poland is effected through registration of the institution with the
Office of Denominational Affairs (art. 30), supported by at least fifteen Polish citizens (art.
31), and including in the application all kinds of information, such as details of the “basic
doctrinal assumptions” of the concerned faith (art. 32(1)(a)) and the applicant’s statute
(containing details—insisted upon by the state—of, inter alia, its aims and proposed
activities, sources of financing and the like) (art. 32(2)).  Church officials are required by law
to notify the appropriate organ of state about the creation, change of name, seat, borders, or
merger, division and annulment of a diocese or parish (art. 14(1)).  The state wants to know
about the appointment or removal from office of the executive organ of a church or other
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religious institution (art. 14(2)).  The Head of the Office of Denominational Affairs may
“express reservations” in regard to the appointment of a foreigner as a responsible church
official entrusted with the duty of notifying the state of the above information and
eventualities (art. 14(4)).  Even in countries experiencing radical change from state control
over religion and religious institutions, some form of control seems necessary during the
period of transition and even thereafter.
The book contains two further chapters, right at the beginning one by Giovanni
Barberini and at the end one by Silvio Ferrari.  Both of these chapters give an overview of
law and religion issues experienced by Eastern European states in transition and provide
excellent synopses of the over all theme of the book, and the problems facing those states in
coming to terms with the new dispensation. They also contain summaries of states upholding
doctrines such as the separation of church and state, preferential treatment of a particular
religion, registration of religious institutions, agreements concluded with the Holy See, and
the like. 
Reading through the pages of Law and Religion in Post-Communist Europe, one is
again struck by the many problems confronting those striving toward a better future under the
norms of good governance. Silvio Ferrari speaks of “A Lost Opportunity?”, noting that “the
legal systems of the post-Communist countries … merely offer a replica ) and sometimes, in
terms of the freedom and equality of religious groups, it is a deficient one ) of the solutions
(which are already in need of reform) adopted in the Western countries” (at 422-23).
In a preface, the editors promised a follow-up volume in which the laws governing
the relationship between church and state in the same Eastern European countries covered in
the current volume is to be recorded and analyzed. I have been informed that Laws on
Religion and the State in Post-Communist Europe (eds. W. Cole Durham & Silvio Ferrari)
has recently been published by Peeters Publishers.
Johan D. van der Vyver, Emory University School of Law
